A flawed analysis

Mr Noble Philip's argument [Sunday Express, 6 April 2025] that Israel Khan SC’s protest actions—including the symbolic destruction of a photograph of the Chief Justice—undermine the judiciary is seriously flawed. Rather, his actions should be understood as a legitimate and necessary exercise of constitutional freedoms aimed at restoring public trust through accountability.

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1. Khan’s Protest Falls Within Constitutional Freedom of Expression

Section 4(i) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago guarantees:

“freedom of thought and expression.”

This includes symbolic speech and protest. Courts have long recognised the right to express dissent—even when that expression is provocative or discomforting—provided it does not incite violence or hatred. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that freedom of expression protects even those views that “offend, shock or disturb” (see Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737).

Khan’s symbolic act—destroying a photograph—may be uncomfortable to some, but it remains within the scope of protected political and symbolic expression. It does not amount to criminal conduct, nor does it legally amount to contempt or defamation absent malicious falsehoods.

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2. It Is Illogical to Blame Khan for Damage to the Judiciary

The assertion that Khan has “deflated the institution of the Chief Justice” misunderstands the root cause of public mistrust. The integrity of the judiciary is not damaged by protest or critique, but by allegations of misconduct that remain uninvestigated, such as:

• The controversial role of the CJ in the Marcia Ayers-Caesar fiasco;

• Allegations of improper influence regarding Housing Development Corporation (HDC) allocations;

• The CJ’s association with convicted fraudsters, which has been reported but not publicly refuted or transparently investigated.

To suggest that a protester is the cause of institutional decline is to confuse diagnosis with disease. As the JCPC held in Archie v Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago [2020] UKPC 23, public allegations against a Chief Justice can undermine the judiciary, and these concerns are legitimate if raised responsibly.

Khan’s long-term protest is rooted in legitimate concerns. His method may be dramatic, but it is designed to highlight inaction, not to erode the rule of law.

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3. Criticism of the CJ Is Not an Attack on the Institution

The argument falsely equates the person of the CJ with the institution of the Chief Justice. But they are distinct. The office must be respected—but so too must its occupant be held to account. As Lord Bingham stated in Sharma v DPP [2006] UKPC 57 at [27], where there is a “potentially credible report of serious misconduct,” the Prime Minister must act.

Respecting the institution requires investigation, not silence. Accountability strengthens public confidence, not weakens it. It is the failure to investigate or to initiate Section 137 proceedings that has left the institution in disrepute, not the protest of one SC.

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4. Conflating Symbolism With Legal Wrongdoing Is Misleading

To argue that Khan’s actions are somehow defamatory without evidence or a legal finding is irresponsible. Trinidad and Tobago’s defamation laws require publication of false statements that harm reputation. Symbolically burning a photograph is not defamation unless it is accompanied by false statements of fact. No evidence has been produced to show this threshold has been met.

Furthermore, there has been no legal action by the CJ or the Law Association against Mr Khan. Silence in response to a supposed defamation claim may suggest that the allegations are either:

• True (truth is an absolute defence), or

• Not legally actionable.

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5. Protest Serves a Democratic Function

Protest, especially by legal professionals, serves a vital democratic role. Mr Khan, as Senior Counsel, has a professional and ethical obligation to act in the public interest and uphold the rule of law. The Judiciary’s legitimacy depends on public confidence, and public confidence can only be restored by truth-seeking mechanisms, not enforced silence.

As Baroness Hale once noted:

“Judges are not above criticism. A healthy democracy must allow for the questioning of judicial conduct, particularly when trust is in doubt.”
(Lecture on Judicial Independence, 2018)

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6. Where Are the Other Voices? That Is Precisely the Problem

The original author laments the lack of “more voices being raised.” But this is not an argument against Mr Khan’s protest. Rather, it underscores how essential his protest has been—precisely because others have remained silent. Silence in the face of alleged misconduct is not neutrality; it is complicity.

Khan’s lone stance since 2017 is not an embarrassment to the Bar—it is an indictment of its inertia.

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Conclusion: Khan’s Protest Is Justified and Constitutionally Protected

Rather than undermining the judiciary, Mr Khan SC is acting to restore public trust by drawing attention to the fact that serious allegations have gone unaddressed.

The failure to trigger section 137 of the Constitution is a constitutional breach by the Executive. Mr Khan’s protest may be unconventional, but it has forced a necessary public reckoning. The symbolic act—burning a photograph—is not unlawful, defamatory, nor institutionally corrosive in law. What corrodes public trust is impunity, not protest.

A cult by any other name...

 

Ravi Balgobin Maharaj's argument [Daily Express 5 April 2025] is logically flawed, rhetorically manipulative, and fundamentally unsound both in structure and substance. His piece, dressed up in pseudo-intellectualism, collapses under scrutiny once you strip away the emotive language and faulty comparisons. Let's address and dismantle his claims systematically, starting with the most glaring fallacies.

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1. False Analogy: Roman Catholic Church vs Church of Scientology

Maharaj argues that because not all hierarchical or belief-based organisations are cults, it is unfair to characterise the UNC as such. However:

• This is a textbook false analogy. The fact that two organisations (e.g., the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scientology) share structural or behavioural characteristics does not disqualify them both from being cultic. In fact, the opposite is true: many scholars of religion, sociology, and psychology do classify all organised religions—including the Roman Catholic Church—as cults, especially when they exhibit:
• Doctrinal infallibility of leadership,
• Enforced obedience to authority,
• Suppression of dissent, and
• Mythologising of leaders.
• The fact that the Roman Catholic Church is older or more mainstream does not remove it from cult categorisation. Cultic dynamics are about power structures, not popularity or historical longevity.
• In political terms, if a party exhibits similar cultic behaviours, it should rightly be interrogated as a political cult. The UNC, under Persad-Bissessar, increasingly fits this mould—centralised control, dissent punished or ignored, and unquestioning loyalty demanded from subordinates.

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2. Dishonest Portrayal of Free Expression within the UNC

Maharaj claims:

“Mrs Persad-Bissessar has always allowed the members of the UNC to express themselves freely…”

This is demonstrably false and misleading, based on well-documented recent resignations:

• Senior figures have publicly stated that they were vilified, sidelined, and threatened with blacklisting for raising internal concerns (see the resignation letter by Ricky Shanklin and six other executives).
• The party’s response has not been one of open dialogue, but rather defensiveness, denials, and ad hominem attacks branding dissenters as orchestrated saboteurs or sore losers.

This aligns with classic cultic patterns, where:

• Dissent is treated as betrayal;
• Critics are expelled or discredited;
• Blind loyalty is rewarded over competence or independence.

These are not the hallmarks of a democratically functioning political party. They are the hallmarks of an organisation sliding into cult-like behaviour.

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3. Hyperbolic and Offensive Historical Comparisons (MLK, Mandela, Malcolm X)

The suggestion that Kamla Persad-Bissessar is the "Malcolm X of her time" is not only absurd but deeply offensive to the historical memory of global civil rights movements:

• Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Malcolm X were revolutionaries who resisted state violence, racial apartheid, and imperial injustice at great personal cost. They did not cling to failing political machines or suppress intra-movement dissent for personal power.
• Persad-Bissessar has not faced systemic oppression—she has had state power, and her record in office (particularly during the People’s Partnership) is not one of grassroots revolution but of status quo politics, peppered with allegations of poor governance and internal purges.
• Unlike civil rights leaders, she actively silences critical voices, as seen with the recent mass resignations. To equate her leadership with a liberation struggle is revisionist and deliberately misleading.

This comparison is not only a false equivalence—it is political idolatry masquerading as analysis.

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4. Argument by Emotion: “No War is Won Without a Strong Leader…”

The military metaphor used—“no war is won without a strong leader commanding loyal troops”—is classic authoritarian apologism. It reframes dissent not as democratic input but as disloyalty, effectively justifying:

• Centralisation of power,
• Suppression of alternative views, and
• Glorification of the leader as a wartime general.

This kind of rhetoric is used to rationalise autocratic rule, not to defend democratic process. It is a dangerous and deeply anti-democratic justification for internal silencing, under the guise of “unity.”

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5. Concluding Refutation: Why the UNC Does Resemble a Cult

Based on political science and sociological criteria, the UNC under Kamla Persad-Bissessar now exhibits numerous cult-like characteristics:

• Leader worship: Kamla is elevated above criticism, with historical mythologising and personality-driven loyalty.
• Suppression of dissent: Critical voices are expelled, marginalised, or publicly discredited.
• Groupthink: Alternative ideas are discouraged; coalition-building is tokenistic and performative.
• False reality: The leadership projects electoral confidence and internal unity despite repeated resignations, declining public trust, and credible reports of internal disillusionment.

Maharaj’s argument relies on logical fallacies, emotional manipulation, and historical revisionism to defend an indefensible structure.

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Final Word

To those observing the UNC and identifying cultic patterns—you are not imagining things. You are witnessing the transformation of a once-formidable political party into a personality-driven machine that prizes obedience over integrity and loyalty over competence. The comparison to a cult is not hyperbole; it is an increasingly accurate political diagnosis.

Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s defenders may attempt to spin resignation after resignation as mere noise—but history has repeatedly shown what happens to political parties that refuse to self-correct. Collapse is inevitable.

Let them cling to delusion. But the public deserves the truth.

Analysis of the Court of Appeal’s Ruling in Jason Jones v The State of Trinidad and Tobago

 

Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision to uphold the criminalisation of anal sex between same-sex adults under the Sexual Offences Act 1986 (SOA 1986) is deeply flawed. The ruling ignores the fundamental rights enshrined in section 4 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and misapplies the savings clause in section 6. Furthermore, it disregards progressive jurisprudence from the Commonwealth, which has consistently favoured the recognition and protection of LGBTQ+ rights under modern human rights frameworks.

1. Violation of Express Constitutional Rights

Section 4 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution expressly guarantees fundamental human rights and freedoms, including:

• The right to liberty, security of the person, and enjoyment of property (s.4(a))
• The right to equality before the law and protection of the law (s.4(b))
• The right to respect for private and family life (s.4(c))
• The right to freedom of thought and expression (s.4(i))

The criminalisation of consensual same-sex acts violates these rights in several ways:

1. Privacy Rights (s.4(c)): By criminalising consensual sexual activity between adults, the state is interfering in private affairs without justification, contrary to established international norms (see Dudgeon v UK [1981] ECHR 7525/76).
2. Equality before the Law (s.4(b)): The law discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, violating the principle of equality before the law (see Toonen v Australia, UNHRC CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992).
3. Personal Liberty (s.4(a)): The threat of criminal sanction restricts the liberty of LGBTQ+ individuals, treating them as second-class citizens in violation of fundamental rights.

2. Misapplication of the Savings Clause (s.6 of the Constitution)

The majority in the Court of Appeal placed undue reliance on the savings clause in section 6 of the Constitution, which was originally intended to preserve laws in the transitional period from colonial rule. However, modern Commonwealth jurisprudence has recognised that savings clauses cannot be used to shield discriminatory laws from scrutiny indefinitely.

In McEwan v Attorney General of Guyana [2018] CCJ 30 (AJ), the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) held that even where a savings clause exists, laws must be interpreted in light of modern constitutional values. Similarly, in LGBT decriminalisation cases in Belize and India (Caleb Orozco v AG of Belize [2016] SC and Navtej Johar v Union of India [2018] SCC 135 SC), courts ruled that savings clauses cannot override fundamental rights. The Court of Appeal in Trinidad and Tobago failed to follow these precedents, thereby failing in its duty to protect fundamental human rights.

3. Inconsistency with the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

The Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago is the supreme law, meaning that any law inconsistent with it is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Section 2 of the Constitution expressly provides:

"This Constitution is the supreme law of Trinidad and Tobago, and any other law that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency."

By upholding SOA 1986 despite its clear inconsistency with section 4 rights, the Court of Appeal has failed to uphold constitutional supremacy. The High Court’s original ruling correctly identified that section 13 and section 16 of SOA 1986 were unconstitutional, and the appellate court erred in reversing this finding.

4. The Role of Parliament and Judicial Responsibility

The majority ruling asserted that judges cannot change the law and that reform is the responsibility of Parliament. This position is legally unsound. While Parliament has the power to legislate, the judiciary has the authority—and indeed the duty—to interpret the Constitution and strike down laws that violate fundamental rights (see Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319 and Matadeen v Pointu [1999] UKPC 66). Courts across the Commonwealth have exercised this power in cases concerning LGBTQ+ rights, including Nadan and McCoskar v State [2005] FJHC 500 (Fiji), where sodomy laws were struck down as unconstitutional.

5. The Problematic Inclusion of Religious Interests

The involvement of a religious body as an interested party in the litigation raises serious concerns about the separation of church and state. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion but does not permit religious doctrine to dictate secular law. The ruling effectively imposes religious morality on all citizens, undermining the principle of neutrality in state governance (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] SCC 79).

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision is legally unsound and inconsistent with modern human rights jurisprudence. The ruling ignores express constitutional rights, misapplies the savings clause, contradicts the principle of constitutional supremacy, and abdicates judicial responsibility in favour of legislative inertia. The judgment should be challenged at the Privy Council or, failing that, repealed by Parliament to align Trinidad and Tobago’s laws with international human rights standards and constitutional principles.

Recommendation: Immediate legislative or judicial intervention is required to rectify this decision and ensure that all citizens enjoy equal protection under the law.