The Real Issue Isn’t “Cuffing Down”—It’s Power, Bullying and Context

The national debate over whether the Prime Minister’s remark—“I’ll cuff you down”—was inappropriate is being distorted by selective outrage and a complete refusal to consider context.

Let us start with the facts. Kamla Persad-Bissessar is a 72-year-old woman. Colm Imbert is a physically able, seasoned political operator with a long and publicly recorded reputation for aggressive parliamentary behaviour. To pretend these two individuals meet each other as equal physical threats is intellectually dishonest.

Was her comment the height of parliamentary decorum? Of course not. But focusing solely on her words while ignoring Imbert’s provoking conduct—jabbing his finger, taunting “why not?”, and escalating what was already a hostile exchange—amounts to erasing the underlying power dynamic. The instigator suddenly becomes the victim, and the person reacting becomes the offender.

It is also remarkable that the PNM Women’s League, normally quick to invoke women’s empowerment, chose to defend the male aggressor rather than acknowledge that pointing in someone’s face, especially at close range, is itself a threatening gesture. Their statement reframes intimidation as innocence and self-defence as violence. That is not feminism; it is political convenience.

None of this excuses deteriorating parliamentary standards. But if we are serious about civility, then we must condemn the entire chain of conduct—not only the final remark spoken by the older woman, but also the behaviour of the man who provoked her and has a track record of berating colleagues publicly.

The integrity of parliamentary debate cannot be restored by chastising only the weaker party in the exchange. Civility is not maintained by punishing the reaction while ignoring the provocation.

If the country wants higher standards from its leaders, then it must demand them consistently—not only when the person raising her voice is a 72-year-old woman standing up to a known bully.

The Cult of Complaint: Daly, LATT, and Bisram vs the Constitution

 

There are moments in public life when the law works exactly as written—swiftly, cleanly, and without scandal—and yet commentators still feel cheated of their outrage.
The appointment of Chief Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh is one such moment.

Faced with a sudden vacancy created by Chief Justice Ivor Archie’s retirement, Acting President Wade Mark followed the Constitution to the letter.
He consulted the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, exercised the discretion vested in his office by section 102 of the Constitution, and appointed the most respected jurist on the Court of Appeal.
The Judiciary avoided paralysis.
The Republic moved on.
And yet—like a Greek chorus of professional dissent—Martin Daly SC, the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago (LATT), and Dr Vishnu Bisram have all rushed to announce that something must be wrong precisely because nothing went wrong.

Daly: nostalgia dressed as critique

Mr Daly, once a formidable constitutional voice, now mistakes efficiency for impropriety.
He concedes that Justice Boodoosingh is worthy, then insists the process was “botched” because it happened quickly.
But the Constitution imposes no timetable.
“Consultation” means exactly what it says—an exchange of views, not a seminar series.
The Privy Council in Re Application by the President of Trinidad and Tobago (1988) 39 WIR 409 confirmed that consultation requires listening, not obedience.
To invent new steps is to rewrite the Constitution by op-ed.

Daly’s lament about who attended the swearing-in ceremony—ministers, defence chiefs, perhaps a stray trumpet—reveals more about his appetite for theatre than about constitutional law.
The Judiciary’s independence does not evaporate because a soldier saluted at the ceremony.
Daly calls this “disturbing.”
Most citizens would call it orderly.

LATT: principle without precision

Not to be outdone, the Law Association produced a statement long on adjectives and short on law.
It declared it “cannot conclude that a reasonable process of consultation was done,” which is a polite way of saying “we have no evidence of wrongdoing, but we’re suspicious anyway.”
The Association then announced that the President must present names, reasons, and ample time for reflection.
Nowhere does the Constitution say any such thing.
These are administrative-law notions dressed up as constitutional duties.
The President’s obligation is procedural, not deliberative: to consult the two political leaders and then decide.
Confidentiality is not conspiracy; it is constitutional prudence.

The LATT’s attempt to expand the meaning of consultation beyond recognition does not safeguard transparency—it undermines executive certainty.
The country cannot afford a system where every constitutional act requires a town-hall meeting and a press release.

Bisram: agreement followed by protest

Enter Dr Vishnu Bisram, whose letter manages the impressive feat of disproving itself.
After conducting his own “consultations” with lawyers, judges, MPs, and civil society, he reports that Justice Boodoosingh was the overwhelming choice of the legal fraternity and the public.
He calls him apolitical, scholarly, hardworking, and “an excellent jurist.”
Then—without pause—he demands constitutional reform because the process that produced this near-perfect outcome was allegedly insufficiently transparent.

This is reasoning worthy of farce: we got exactly the right result, therefore the process must change.
Dr Bisram’s proposal to involve “civil society” in judicial appointments sounds noble until one asks which civil society and by what metric.
Judges are not elected; their legitimacy derives from independence, not applause.
To invite lobbying into the process would politicise the bench beyond repair.

The law versus the performance

What unites Daly, the LATT, and Bisram is not principle but performance—the conviction that every constitutional act must be wrapped in spectacle to be legitimate.
They confuse transparency with theatrics and consultation with consensus.
But the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago is built on deliberate separation of functions: the President appoints; the Prime Minister and Opposition Leader are consulted; the Judiciary remains independent.
No amount of editorial hand-wringing alters that structure.

The truth is disarmingly simple.
Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh was the most qualified and broadly respected candidate.
He was appointed swiftly, lawfully, and with sufficient consultation under the Constitution.
Those who insist otherwise are not defending democracy; they are demanding drama.

If every lawful act must now be padded with delay, debate, and “civil-society engagement,” we will soon have governance by perpetual symposium.
The Republic does not need that.
It needs public officers who read the Constitution before rewriting it in the press.

The Judiciary has a new Chief Justice, and the Constitution was followed.
The rest is a chorus of self-importance—off-key, off-text, and out of time.

Who is Paying Roger Alexander’s Legal Bills?

The recent clash between Homeland Security Minister Roger Alexander and prison supervisor Garth Guada raises a question bigger than the personal reputations of either man: who is footing the bill for Alexander’s high-powered legal defence?

The backdrop

Alexander’s legal team, led by Senior Counsel Anand Ramlogan, has denied allegations that he improperly met with gang leaders while serving as a police officer. They have also rejected claims that his actions were motivated by vendettas or bias. These are serious allegations, but they mostly concern Alexander’s conduct before he entered politics, while he was still in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

Why this matters

When a sitting minister hires some of the most expensive lawyers in the country, the public has a right to ask: is this coming out of his pocket, his political party’s pocket, or ours?

• If he is paying personally – fair enough. A minister, like anyone else, has the right to defend his reputation.

• If his political party or donors are paying – that raises questions of political influence, but at least taxpayers are not carrying the cost.

• If the State is paying – that is deeply problematic. Taxpayer money should never be used to defend allegations of personal misconduct that occurred before someone entered government.

The principle at stake

Public funds can be used to defend ministers only if:

1. The allegations arise directly from the lawful exercise of official ministerial duties;

2. The defence is necessary to protect the integrity of the office itself; and

3. The alleged acts were within the scope of authority.

That is clearly not the case here. Meetings with gang figures, alleged misuse of police intelligence, or personal vendettas are not “ministerial duties.”

A risk of abuse

If it turns out that Alexander’s legal bills are being covered by the government, that would amount to an improper use of public money. It would:

• Divert funds from public service to defend private reputation;

• Create a conflict of interest, since Alexander is now part of the government that would be funding him;

• Undermine accountability, shielding ministers from the consequences of their personal actions.

The public deserves clarity

The question is simple: Who is paying? Until Alexander or the government answers, suspicion will remain. If taxpayers are footing the bill, the matter goes beyond politics—it becomes an issue of legality, accountability, and the misuse of public funds.

Conclusion

Alexander is entitled to a legal defence. What he is not entitled to is a taxpayer-funded shield for personal actions taken before he became a minister. The public deserves transparency. Anything less is an abuse of trust.

Medical Negligence in T&T – Let’s Get the Law Right Before We Reform It

 

In the wake of the tragic death of young Jasher, emotions are understandably running high. The calls for reform of Trinidad and Tobago’s healthcare system are urgent and sincere. But if we are to achieve lasting change, our public conversation must be grounded in correct legal principles. Unfortunately, too many public statements – even by lawyers – muddle the law on medical negligence, vicarious liability, and accountability.

First, the Bolam test is not “the” standard for all medical negligence issues (cited by Pavitra Ramharack, head of chambers at Pavitra Ramharack Attorneys at Law in the Trinidad Guardian). Established in the 1957 English case Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, it applies to clinical judgment and technique – diagnosis, treatment, and similar professional decisions – but it is not absolute. The Bolitho decision in 1997 refined Bolam, making clear that even if a body of medical opinion supports a doctor’s conduct, the court must be satisfied that opinion is logically defensible. In short, Bolam is not a blank cheque for the medical profession.

Second, when it comes to patient consent and risk disclosure, the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) replaced Bolam with a patient-centred test. A doctor must take reasonable care to ensure the patient is aware of any material risks and reasonable alternatives. Whether Trinidad and Tobago’s appellate courts have expressly adopted Montgomery is still to be determined, but it is wrong to write as though Bolam governs consent everywhere.

Third, the notion that “public sector doctors are protected by contracts” and therefore cannot be sued is legally incorrect. The Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) are statutory corporations and are routinely sued for medical negligence. They are vicariously liable for their staff. In some cases, doctors and other clinicians are named as individual defendants alongside the RHA. There is no legal blanket immunity simply because someone works for the public health service.

Fourth, the suggestion that healthcare workers should bear “some contributory negligence” for adverse outcomes misuses the term. In law, “contributory negligence” refers to the claimant’s own fault, which can reduce damages. The proper mechanism for sharing liability between defendants is “contribution” under the relevant statutes. Whether a clinician personally pays any damages depends on contribution orders and indemnity arrangements, not on a layperson’s redefinition of contributory negligence.

Fifth, public sector negligence claims already follow the principle of suing the body with primary liability – usually the RHA – and the courts have repeatedly confirmed this. What we lack is not a legal pathway for accountability, but an operational culture that enforces high standards across both public and private healthcare.

Finally, while it is tempting to speculate that “a few extra minutes” with a patient would have changed the outcome, in court such statements are meaningless without expert evidence. To succeed in a medical negligence case, one must prove breach of duty – judged by Bolam/Bolitho or Montgomery – and causation linking that breach to the harm. This requires admissible, qualified expert opinion, not post-hoc assumptions.

Public accountability in healthcare is achieved by naming and suing the correct defendants, holding professionals to the correct legal standard, and reforming systems to address repeated failures. Misstating the law does not help the cause of justice for Jasher or for the next potential victim.

If reform is truly the goal, it should be based on accurate understanding:

• Clinical judgment is assessed under Bolam/Bolitho.
• Consent and risk disclosure (in England and Wales) are assessed under Montgomery; T&T’s position is not definitively settled.
• RHAs are suable and vicariously liable; doctors can also be named.
• Apportionment between defendants is by contribution, not contributory negligence.
• Evidence, not speculation, wins negligence claims.

Getting the law right is the first step toward getting healthcare right. Reform based on flawed legal premises will fail. Reform based on precision and truth can save lives.

Citations

• Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582
• Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232
• Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11
• NWRHA v Cheryl Miller (TT 2021 CA 33)
• Bevon Dollard v North Central RHA (TT 2019 HC 288)
• Kellman v Dowes & NCRHA
• State Liability and Proceedings Act (T&T)
• Singh-Weekes v South-West RHA [2025] UKPC 10

The relevance of the PCA

It is deeply concerning when an institution that is supposed to hold law enforcement accountable, such as the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) in Trinidad and Tobago, fails to take meaningful action following investigations of serious allegations, including extrajudicial killings and police misconduct. Based on available information, the PCA has indeed faced significant criticism over the years for its lack of effective follow-through and transparency regarding its investigations.

While the PCA is mandated to investigate complaints against police officers, including allegations of misconduct and extrajudicial killings, the authority’s actions (or lack thereof) have often been scrutinised by both the public and advocacy groups. The PCA’s annual reports have, at times, highlighted the number of complaints and investigations undertaken, but there have been very few instances where those investigations resulted in tangible outcomes such as disciplinary actions, prosecutions, or public accountability.

Key Issues with the PCA’s Effectiveness

1. Lack of Transparency: One of the main criticisms of the PCA is its perceived lack of transparency. Despite having investigated numerous allegations over the years, there is often little public information on the results of those investigations. Victims and their families are left without answers, and the public loses confidence in the authority's ability to act decisively.

2. Delayed or Inactionable Outcomes: In many cases, investigations seem to drag on indefinitely without any clear resolution. Allegations of extrajudicial killings, in particular, have been prominent, yet no significant action appears to have been taken. This can lead to a perception of impunity within the police force, undermining the public’s trust in both the PCA and the police.

3. Political Influence and Institutional Resistance: The PCA's role as an independent body is meant to ensure that law enforcement officers are held accountable without political interference. However, the influence of political actors and institutional resistance within the police force has often been cited as a barrier to the PCA’s effectiveness. This creates a lack of political will to take strong action against police officers, especially in high-profile or sensitive cases.

4. Limited Resources and Powers: The PCA’s ability to hold police officers accountable may also be limited by insufficient resources, legal powers, or support from other state institutions. For instance, the PCA does not have the same powers of prosecution as the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), which limits its ability to enforce actions based on its findings. Its role is largely investigative, but without the power to prosecute or make binding decisions, its impact can be limited.

Extrajudicial Killings and the PCA

The issue of extrajudicial killings by police officers has been a longstanding concern in Trinidad and Tobago. While the PCA has been tasked with investigating these serious allegations, many of these cases remain unresolved or have not resulted in the prosecution of officers involved. The lack of convictions or meaningful disciplinary actions sends a troubling message that there are few consequences for police officers who engage in unlawful killings or other misconduct.

Examples of Criticism and Public Sentiment

Over the years, human rights organisations, civil society groups, and the media have repeatedly criticised the PCA for its inaction. There have been public calls for greater oversight and reform, but the response from both the PCA and government institutions has often been insufficient. The perception of a "culture of impunity" among the police, especially in cases of extrajudicial killings, only deepens when investigations by the PCA result in no concrete actions or outcomes.

Moving Forward

For the PCA to become a truly effective body in ensuring accountability for police actions, it must:

• Ensure transparency in its investigations and outcomes, providing the public with regular updates and clear explanations of its actions.

• Strengthen its legal and operational capacity, perhaps by seeking the ability to make binding recommendations or refer cases directly to the courts for prosecution.

• Reform the institutional and political environment that may be preventing the PCA from acting independently, ensuring that the police are held to account in all cases, including extrajudicial killings and other serious misconduct.

• Engage with civil society to foster a stronger relationship of trust and accountability between the public, law enforcement, and oversight bodies.

Unfortunately, there seems to have been a persistent failure to take action in cases of police misconduct in Trinidad and Tobago, leading to widespread disillusionment with the PCA's effectiveness. Until there is a substantial shift in both the operational capacity of the PCA and the political will to hold the police accountable, it is unlikely that public confidence in the institution will be restored.

A Systems Failure in Trinidad and Tobago

The problems plaguing Trinidad and Tobago are systems problems. Systems thinking is a separate field, evolved from handling complexity and problems that cannot be resolved through simplifying. It looks at variables and connections/interrelationships, and looks at where small iterations or influence can affect meaningful change. Trinidad and Tobago suffers from many such complex problems, but each of those problems are connected to the other so you can see that there are systems nested within systems, or sitting parallel to the systems. Complexity and chaos is the result. It is not helped by corruption, lack of critical thinking and downright stupidity. The last 10 years of political governance is a prime example.

Let us deal with national security. I note that Roger Alexander is already mouthing off. Nothing surprising there. His internal character was on full display during his television programme – a bully, lack of critical thinking skills (and probably qualifications), and resorting to the "brute squad" mentality of the Randolph Burroughs era. It seems he did not learn anything from Gary Griffith. Shutting your mouth and go about your job quietly. I trust that we will soon see police officers wearing and using body cams and full investigations for all these extrajudicial killings.

Firearms users licences – I suppose soon we can load up the "matic" and empty the clip. There is a disturbing shortsighted thinking coming from the newly installed Prime Minister. She seems bent (from her actions so far) in following the failed USA (Ministry of homeland security? Please!). The solution is not more guns, but the opposite. Statistics and real-world examples abound where countries that do not have armed citizens are safer. In fact, many of these countries do not even have armed police. What we need is more effective policing. Over the last 20 years I have written that the purported solve rate of serious crimes is 6%. This itself is a misleading figure because the robustness of evidence presented to the court for a conviction remains at 1% of that 6%. This means that the police are either not trained sufficiently to gather forensic evidence in a robust manner sufficient enough to satisfy the court and rules of evidence, or that the police force remains generally lazy and prone to shortcuts and corruption. The public sphere is inundated with cases of police officers taking bribes to forego prosecution. There is also a notable lack of will to take disciplinary action against police officers by its leadership.

In terms of the economy, the entire countries know that we are in for a hard time. Clearly, the country is bankrupt or nearly so. Billions have gone missing with no explanation. The former minister of finance was an arrogant pompek. There is more than one prima facie case of corruption sitting in his lap. Steps must be taken to diversify income streams, decentralise public services, build/repair the decades-neglected infrastructure, find ways to bring wages to match living costs without further bankrupting the country. Reduce national debt, manage the collection of income tax, and put a curb on imports. A harsh measure, I know, but a temporary solution.

Remove egos from all members of the new government. Accept criticism, chew on it and digest it. It is a sign of maturity and growth to do this. Take on-board that you do not know everything, and members of the public may have solutions also. You are not expected to have all the answers. But you can seek answers from those with the correct expertise. In doing so, do not use it as a means of corrupting the process, by hiring unqualified family and friends.

Fear, Favouritism, and the Fall of a Nation – A Rebuttal to Lynette Joseph’s PNM Hagiography

In her recent commentary [Daily Express https://tinyurl.com/2x4rbhda], Lynette Joseph offers readers a lyrical but profoundly misleading take on the upcoming 2025 general election. She champions Professor Hamid Ghany’s polling analysis but then veers into a full-throated defence of the People’s National Movement (PNM)—not as a political party, but as a fixed point in national destiny. Her piece masquerades as political insight; in truth, it is a partisan hymn to a ruling elite who have governed without vision, without transparency, and without accountability.

Let us confront the facts: Trinidad and Tobago is not thriving. It is treading water in a sea of missed opportunities, systemic patronage, and elite impunity.

---

The Real Legacy of the PNM: Cronyism, Cutbacks, and Captured Institutions

Lynette Joseph’s portrayal of the PNM as an inclusive, reformist movement would be laughable—if it were not so offensive to the thousands of citizens who have been shut out, let down, and sold short by this administration.

1. The Dismantling of Educational Opportunity

Under the PNM, access to higher education has been gutted. The Government Assistance for Tuition Expenses (GATE) programme, once a passport to progress for working-class families, has been rolled back. Postgraduate students have been pushed out, and those from middle-income households now face crippling fees. Meanwhile, those with political connections receive scholarships in secret, with no application process, no criteria, and no requirement to repay.

One scandalous example: Laurel Lezama-Lee Sing, a former PNM senator, received over TT$500,000 in state funds for overseas education. This “scholarship” was never publicly accounted for, raising red flags in the Auditor General’s 2010 Report. The lack of transparency violated the principles of natural justice and fiduciary duty—yet not a single minister was held accountable.

This is not governance. It is state-sanctioned nepotism.

2. The Institutionalisation of Crony Contracts

The PNM has entrenched a system of state contracts awarded not on merit, but on loyalty, family name, and political proximity.

• The Young family, including the Prime Minister’s brother, has been linked to security contracts with NGC and Heritage Petroleum. No competitive tendering. No public scrutiny.

• The Al-Rawi family, with substantial real estate holdings, has benefitted from state leases, housing consultations, and untendered legal briefs.

• Projects in Point Fortin, Moruga, and EMBD land developments have exploded in cost—often doubling initial estimates—without explanation or consequence. Where are the audits? Where is the procurement oversight?

These are not isolated incidents. They are symptoms of a system designed to reward insiders and exclude the rest.

---

Silencing the Watchdogs, Stalling the Law

The PNM deliberately starved the Procurement Regulator’s office of funding, delaying the enforcement of legislation that could curb precisely the abuses listed above. It has hollowed out independent offices, discouraged transparency, and actively undermined Parliamentary Joint Select Committees, refusing to answer hard questions or produce key documents.

This is government by evasion, not oversight.

---

The Myth of Inclusivity

Joseph claims the PNM “welcomes all and sundry”. But inclusivity is not a slogan—it is a practice. In reality:

• Dissenters face blacklisting.

• Whistleblowers are silenced or sidelined.

• Only those who “play the game” are rewarded with jobs, contracts, or housing allocations.

In contrast, she paints the United National Congress (UNC) as merely “salivating over crossover citizens”. Yet it is the UNC that has opened its candidate slate to youth, women, and professionals from across the social spectrum. Has it made mistakes? Certainly. But unlike the PNM, it is no longer operating as a closed family firm.

---

A Nation in Decline, A Future at Risk

Joseph closes by suggesting the 2025 election is “not about ethnicity or religion” but about “who will wake up and smell the fearsome IMF coffee”. On this, we agree—but she fails to mention that it is the PNM’s economic mismanagement that brewed that coffee in the first place.

With oil and gas revenues volatile, and no serious economic diversification, Trinidad and Tobago stands on a precipice. Corruption, brain drain, and inequality are not abstract risks—they are daily realities. This is not just bad politics. It is an existential failure of leadership.

---

Conclusion: Reject Fear, Demand Accountability

Lynette Joseph’s article asks us to ignore history, forgive betrayal, and accept the status quo as inevitable. But we must reject nostalgia for a past that never served all of us equally. The 2025 election is not a coronation. It is a chance to reclaim the republic from a political cartel that governs by favour, not fairness.

We are not powerless. Our votes are not valueless.

Let us vote not for party, but for principle. Let us rebuild a nation not for the connected few—but for the many who have waited too long for justice, jobs, and dignity.

Gun control vs Accountability

 

This letter rebuts recent public comments (especially by PM in waiting Stuart Young [Daily Express 12/04/25]) suggesting that the solution to Trinidad and Tobago’s violent crime crisis may lie in expanding access to firearms for law-abiding citizens and in the creation of elite police squads. While these proposals may sound appealing to a fearful public, the evidence—both local and international—overwhelmingly shows that such approaches are ineffective and potentially dangerous. What is urgently needed is not more guns, but more justice.

Guns do not solve crime—they escalate it.
The United States offers a cautionary tale. It leads the developed world in both gun ownership and gun-related homicides. The 2023 Small Arms Survey estimates over 393 million civilian-held firearms in the US—more than one gun per person. Yet, rather than feeling safer, Americans face a gun death rate 25 times higher than other high-income countries (Everytown for Gun Safety, 2023). Rather than acting as a deterrent, widespread gun availability often escalates conflict and leads to tragic outcomes—whether in domestic disputes, community altercations, or mistaken identity.

Arming the public not only increases the number of firearms in circulation but also increases the chances of those firearms ending up in the wrong hands—through theft, trafficking, or loss. It is no coincidence that studies show more guns equals more gun crime. Trinidad and Tobago’s focus should not be to emulate failed models, but to learn from them.

The real crisis is not lack of firepower, but lack of justice.
Trinidad and Tobago suffers from a chronic collapse in law enforcement effectiveness. According to recent figures, the detection rate for homicides hovers around 6%. Worse still, the prosecution rate is just 1% of that 6%—an effective prosecution rate of roughly 0.06%. This means that nearly all perpetrators know they are unlikely to face any consequences. No society can claim to be governed by the rule of law when the odds of being caught and punished are that low. The problem is not the absence of weapons in citizens’ hands—it is the near-total absence of consequences for violent crime.

Rather than introducing more firearms into an already volatile environment, the Government should prioritise:

• Judicial reform to ensure speedier and more efficient prosecutions;

• Investment in forensic and investigative capacity so that evidence gathered is robust and admissible;

• Training and oversight of the police to improve professionalism, reduce corruption, and increase detection rates;

• Public trust and community policing, which are the true foundation of sustainable security.

Elite squads and undercover units may have a place in specific tactical operations, but they cannot replace a police force that the population trusts and a judiciary that delivers timely justice. Additionally, the proposal for legal immunity for undercover officers involved in criminal acts raises grave constitutional and human rights concerns and must be subject to robust legal safeguards—not political promises.

Conclusion: A nation armed is not a nation safe.
If Trinidad and Tobago truly wishes to combat violent crime, it must resist the false comfort of arming its populace. Guns are not justice. Swift detection, credible evidence, and timely, transparent trials are the only sustainable deterrents to violent crime. Without these, even the best-equipped elite squads will be chasing shadows while the streets remain unsafe.

A flawed analysis

Mr Noble Philip's argument [Sunday Express, 6 April 2025] that Israel Khan SC’s protest actions—including the symbolic destruction of a photograph of the Chief Justice—undermine the judiciary is seriously flawed. Rather, his actions should be understood as a legitimate and necessary exercise of constitutional freedoms aimed at restoring public trust through accountability.

---

1. Khan’s Protest Falls Within Constitutional Freedom of Expression

Section 4(i) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago guarantees:

“freedom of thought and expression.”

This includes symbolic speech and protest. Courts have long recognised the right to express dissent—even when that expression is provocative or discomforting—provided it does not incite violence or hatred. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that freedom of expression protects even those views that “offend, shock or disturb” (see Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737).

Khan’s symbolic act—destroying a photograph—may be uncomfortable to some, but it remains within the scope of protected political and symbolic expression. It does not amount to criminal conduct, nor does it legally amount to contempt or defamation absent malicious falsehoods.

---

2. It Is Illogical to Blame Khan for Damage to the Judiciary

The assertion that Khan has “deflated the institution of the Chief Justice” misunderstands the root cause of public mistrust. The integrity of the judiciary is not damaged by protest or critique, but by allegations of misconduct that remain uninvestigated, such as:

• The controversial role of the CJ in the Marcia Ayers-Caesar fiasco;

• Allegations of improper influence regarding Housing Development Corporation (HDC) allocations;

• The CJ’s association with convicted fraudsters, which has been reported but not publicly refuted or transparently investigated.

To suggest that a protester is the cause of institutional decline is to confuse diagnosis with disease. As the JCPC held in Archie v Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago [2020] UKPC 23, public allegations against a Chief Justice can undermine the judiciary, and these concerns are legitimate if raised responsibly.

Khan’s long-term protest is rooted in legitimate concerns. His method may be dramatic, but it is designed to highlight inaction, not to erode the rule of law.

---

3. Criticism of the CJ Is Not an Attack on the Institution

The argument falsely equates the person of the CJ with the institution of the Chief Justice. But they are distinct. The office must be respected—but so too must its occupant be held to account. As Lord Bingham stated in Sharma v DPP [2006] UKPC 57 at [27], where there is a “potentially credible report of serious misconduct,” the Prime Minister must act.

Respecting the institution requires investigation, not silence. Accountability strengthens public confidence, not weakens it. It is the failure to investigate or to initiate Section 137 proceedings that has left the institution in disrepute, not the protest of one SC.

---

4. Conflating Symbolism With Legal Wrongdoing Is Misleading

To argue that Khan’s actions are somehow defamatory without evidence or a legal finding is irresponsible. Trinidad and Tobago’s defamation laws require publication of false statements that harm reputation. Symbolically burning a photograph is not defamation unless it is accompanied by false statements of fact. No evidence has been produced to show this threshold has been met.

Furthermore, there has been no legal action by the CJ or the Law Association against Mr Khan. Silence in response to a supposed defamation claim may suggest that the allegations are either:

• True (truth is an absolute defence), or

• Not legally actionable.

---

5. Protest Serves a Democratic Function

Protest, especially by legal professionals, serves a vital democratic role. Mr Khan, as Senior Counsel, has a professional and ethical obligation to act in the public interest and uphold the rule of law. The Judiciary’s legitimacy depends on public confidence, and public confidence can only be restored by truth-seeking mechanisms, not enforced silence.

As Baroness Hale once noted:

“Judges are not above criticism. A healthy democracy must allow for the questioning of judicial conduct, particularly when trust is in doubt.”
(Lecture on Judicial Independence, 2018)

---

6. Where Are the Other Voices? That Is Precisely the Problem

The original author laments the lack of “more voices being raised.” But this is not an argument against Mr Khan’s protest. Rather, it underscores how essential his protest has been—precisely because others have remained silent. Silence in the face of alleged misconduct is not neutrality; it is complicity.

Khan’s lone stance since 2017 is not an embarrassment to the Bar—it is an indictment of its inertia.

---

Conclusion: Khan’s Protest Is Justified and Constitutionally Protected

Rather than undermining the judiciary, Mr Khan SC is acting to restore public trust by drawing attention to the fact that serious allegations have gone unaddressed.

The failure to trigger section 137 of the Constitution is a constitutional breach by the Executive. Mr Khan’s protest may be unconventional, but it has forced a necessary public reckoning. The symbolic act—burning a photograph—is not unlawful, defamatory, nor institutionally corrosive in law. What corrodes public trust is impunity, not protest.

A cult by any other name...

 

Ravi Balgobin Maharaj's argument [Daily Express 5 April 2025] is logically flawed, rhetorically manipulative, and fundamentally unsound both in structure and substance. His piece, dressed up in pseudo-intellectualism, collapses under scrutiny once you strip away the emotive language and faulty comparisons. Let's address and dismantle his claims systematically, starting with the most glaring fallacies.

---

1. False Analogy: Roman Catholic Church vs Church of Scientology

Maharaj argues that because not all hierarchical or belief-based organisations are cults, it is unfair to characterise the UNC as such. However:

• This is a textbook false analogy. The fact that two organisations (e.g., the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scientology) share structural or behavioural characteristics does not disqualify them both from being cultic. In fact, the opposite is true: many scholars of religion, sociology, and psychology do classify all organised religions—including the Roman Catholic Church—as cults, especially when they exhibit:
• Doctrinal infallibility of leadership,
• Enforced obedience to authority,
• Suppression of dissent, and
• Mythologising of leaders.
• The fact that the Roman Catholic Church is older or more mainstream does not remove it from cult categorisation. Cultic dynamics are about power structures, not popularity or historical longevity.
• In political terms, if a party exhibits similar cultic behaviours, it should rightly be interrogated as a political cult. The UNC, under Persad-Bissessar, increasingly fits this mould—centralised control, dissent punished or ignored, and unquestioning loyalty demanded from subordinates.

---

2. Dishonest Portrayal of Free Expression within the UNC

Maharaj claims:

“Mrs Persad-Bissessar has always allowed the members of the UNC to express themselves freely…”

This is demonstrably false and misleading, based on well-documented recent resignations:

• Senior figures have publicly stated that they were vilified, sidelined, and threatened with blacklisting for raising internal concerns (see the resignation letter by Ricky Shanklin and six other executives).
• The party’s response has not been one of open dialogue, but rather defensiveness, denials, and ad hominem attacks branding dissenters as orchestrated saboteurs or sore losers.

This aligns with classic cultic patterns, where:

• Dissent is treated as betrayal;
• Critics are expelled or discredited;
• Blind loyalty is rewarded over competence or independence.

These are not the hallmarks of a democratically functioning political party. They are the hallmarks of an organisation sliding into cult-like behaviour.

---

3. Hyperbolic and Offensive Historical Comparisons (MLK, Mandela, Malcolm X)

The suggestion that Kamla Persad-Bissessar is the "Malcolm X of her time" is not only absurd but deeply offensive to the historical memory of global civil rights movements:

• Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Malcolm X were revolutionaries who resisted state violence, racial apartheid, and imperial injustice at great personal cost. They did not cling to failing political machines or suppress intra-movement dissent for personal power.
• Persad-Bissessar has not faced systemic oppression—she has had state power, and her record in office (particularly during the People’s Partnership) is not one of grassroots revolution but of status quo politics, peppered with allegations of poor governance and internal purges.
• Unlike civil rights leaders, she actively silences critical voices, as seen with the recent mass resignations. To equate her leadership with a liberation struggle is revisionist and deliberately misleading.

This comparison is not only a false equivalence—it is political idolatry masquerading as analysis.

---

4. Argument by Emotion: “No War is Won Without a Strong Leader…”

The military metaphor used—“no war is won without a strong leader commanding loyal troops”—is classic authoritarian apologism. It reframes dissent not as democratic input but as disloyalty, effectively justifying:

• Centralisation of power,
• Suppression of alternative views, and
• Glorification of the leader as a wartime general.

This kind of rhetoric is used to rationalise autocratic rule, not to defend democratic process. It is a dangerous and deeply anti-democratic justification for internal silencing, under the guise of “unity.”

---

5. Concluding Refutation: Why the UNC Does Resemble a Cult

Based on political science and sociological criteria, the UNC under Kamla Persad-Bissessar now exhibits numerous cult-like characteristics:

• Leader worship: Kamla is elevated above criticism, with historical mythologising and personality-driven loyalty.
• Suppression of dissent: Critical voices are expelled, marginalised, or publicly discredited.
• Groupthink: Alternative ideas are discouraged; coalition-building is tokenistic and performative.
• False reality: The leadership projects electoral confidence and internal unity despite repeated resignations, declining public trust, and credible reports of internal disillusionment.

Maharaj’s argument relies on logical fallacies, emotional manipulation, and historical revisionism to defend an indefensible structure.

---

Final Word

To those observing the UNC and identifying cultic patterns—you are not imagining things. You are witnessing the transformation of a once-formidable political party into a personality-driven machine that prizes obedience over integrity and loyalty over competence. The comparison to a cult is not hyperbole; it is an increasingly accurate political diagnosis.

Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s defenders may attempt to spin resignation after resignation as mere noise—but history has repeatedly shown what happens to political parties that refuse to self-correct. Collapse is inevitable.

Let them cling to delusion. But the public deserves the truth.