16 Mar 2025

The Conflict Between Sections 76 and 80 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and Its Broader Implications

The unfolding political situation in Trinidad and Tobago, where an outgoing Prime Minister (Dr Keith Rowley) is effectively handpicking his successor (Stuart Young) while retaining leadership of the governing party (PNM), raises serious constitutional, political, and democratic concerns. This issue is compounded by the fact that the President, Christine Kangaloo, was a recent member of the same political party and appointed by Dr Rowley himself, raising further questions about institutional neutrality.

At the heart of this issue is the constitutional tension between Sections 76 and 80, and the broader impact on governance, democracy, economic accountability, and public trust.


1. The Constitutional Conflict: Sections 76 and 80

Section 76: Appointment of the Prime Minister

  • Section 76(1) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago states that the President must appoint as Prime Minister a Member of the House of Representatives who commands the support of the majority of members.
  • Traditionally, this means the leader of the ruling party, but it does not specify that the Prime Minister can appoint their own successor while remaining leader of the party.
  • The problem arises because Stuart Young has not faced the electorate as leader of the government and is instead being chosen internally.
  • Given that Dr Rowley remains leader of the PNM, the real power structure remains unchanged.

Section 80: Presidential Discretion in Appointment

  • Section 80(1) states that the President shall act “in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet.”
  • However, Section 80(2) allows the President discretion in certain matters, including the appointment of a Prime Minister when there is ambiguity about who commands a majority in Parliament.
  • Given that the President was a PNM member and was appointed by Dr Rowley, her ability to exercise independent discretion is questionable.
  • This raises a fundamental issue of constitutional impartiality—was President Kangaloo acting independently, or was she following directives from her political associates?

Key Constitutional Issue:

  • If Dr Rowley remains PNM leader, and his successor is chosen by him and rubber-stamped by a President aligned with his party, does this violate the spirit of democracy?
  • It effectively bypasses the electorate and avoids accountability, turning the Prime Minister’s office into a de facto appointment rather than an elected position.

2. Political Implications: Erosion of Democracy and Institutional Integrity

Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy

  • The entire Westminster system is built on the idea that the Prime Minister is accountable to Parliament and, ultimately, to the people.
  • By handpicking a successor without an election, Dr Rowley is setting a precedent where the Prime Ministership becomes an internal party decision rather than a democratic process.
  • A Prime Minister who has not faced the electorate lacks democratic legitimacy, particularly in a country where corruption and economic mismanagement are major concerns.

Collapse of Institutional Checks and Balances

  • The President is supposed to act independently, but given her political background in the PNM, there is a perception of bias that weakens public trust in the office.
  • The Cabinet’s rubber-stamping of Young’s appointment suggests that the Executive is operating without genuine scrutiny.
  • The Opposition lacks the strength to counter this, leading to a situation where one party controls the Presidency, Parliament, and Prime Ministership without direct electoral validation.

3. Social Consequences: Public Distrust and Disillusionment

Declining Trust in Government

  • Trinidad and Tobago has a history of political tribalism, but this level of perceived undemocratic manoeuvring can significantly erode trust in institutions.
  • People may start to view the political system as rigged—where elections don’t really matter because power is circulated within party elites rather than decided by the voters.
  • A government that lacks legitimacy fuels social unrest, disengagement from voting, and increased scepticism towards political leadership.

Rise of Political Apathy or Radicalisation

  • If citizens believe their votes don’t count, this could lead to a decline in voter participation—a dangerous outcome for any democracy.
  • Alternatively, it could fuel more radical political movements that reject the current system altogether, leading to greater polarisation and potential social instability.

4. Financial and Economic Ramifications: $3 Billion Unaccounted for and Continued Mismanagement

PNM’s Economic Track Record: Financial Mismanagement and Corruption

  • The PNM has been in power for nearly a decade, presiding over widespread financial mismanagement.
  • The Auditor General’s report revealed that $3 billion is unaccounted for, an issue that reached the Privy Council, yet there has been no accountability or resolution.
  • The failure to address corruption and economic mismanagement weakens investor confidence and limits economic growth.

Appointment of a New PM Without a Mandate Exacerbates Economic Decline

  • A Prime Minister who has not faced the electorate is unlikely to implement major reforms, as they lack a clear democratic mandate.
  • Investors and international partners may lose confidence in the government, further weakening the country’s economy.
  • Without electoral legitimacy, Young’s government would be more focused on maintaining internal party power than addressing real economic concerns such as inflation, employment, and energy-sector instability.

Burden on the Taxpayer

  • If the UNC challenges this appointment in court, as they should, it will result in high legal costs borne by the taxpayer.
  • More importantly, if the challenge is successful, it could trigger a constitutional crisis, requiring new elections or legislative reforms—both of which will cost the country millions more in public funds.

5. The Need for Clearer Accountability: Avoiding "Prime Ministership by Theft"

Reforming the Appointment Process

  • The current conflict between Sections 76 and 80 highlights the need for explicit constitutional reform to prevent similar occurrences in the future.
  • A Prime Minister should not be able to appoint their own successor while retaining party leadership—this is fundamentally undemocratic.
  • The President should be required to demonstrate clear evidence of parliamentary support before confirming a new Prime Minister.

Immediate Legal Action Is Necessary

  • The UNC and civil society must challenge this appointment in court, forcing greater transparency in the process.
  • Even if the legal challenge does not succeed in reversing the appointment, it sets a precedent that the electorate will not tolerate unchecked power.

Conclusion: A Dangerous Precedent for Trinidad and Tobago

The appointment of Stuart Young as Prime Minister without an electoral mandate, facilitated by a President with close ties to the ruling party, represents a clear erosion of democratic principles. The constitutional conflict between Sections 76 and 80 underscores the need for greater accountability and transparency in executive appointments.

The political, social, and financial consequences of this manoeuvre are profound:

  • It undermines democracy by allowing the Prime Ministership to be controlled by party elites rather than the electorate.
  • It damages public trust in institutions, increasing political apathy and instability.
  • It perpetuates financial mismanagement, with an unaccountable administration continuing questionable economic practices.

If left unchallenged, this situation sets a dangerous precedent where future Prime Ministers can entrench themselves in power without electoral legitimacy—an effective slide towards dictatorship. Trinidad and Tobago must act now to defend its democratic integrity before it is too late.